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THE OAS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: LESSONS 
FROM RECENT WEST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
Stephen J. Schnably* 
The Organization of American States (OAS) has long been 
committed to two fundamental principles not easily reconciled. The 
OAS Charter requires member states to adopt "representative 
democracy."1 Building on earlier resolutions, the General Assembly 
declared in the Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001 that "[t]he 
peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy. "2 Yet the Inter-
American Democratic Charter also requires "due respect for the 
principle of non-intervention."3 Similarly, the OAS Charter gives each 
member state the "right to choose, without external interference, its 
political ... system and to organize itself in the way best suited to it.''4 
In responding to classic military coups against elected 
governments since 1991, the OAS has resolved the tension between 
democracy and non-intervention in favor of the former. For example, 
the OAS condemned a coup in Haiti in 1991 and a military-supported 
ouster of Ecuador's President in 2000.5 Its response has been varied in 
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1. Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 3(d), Apr. 30, 1948, O.A.S.T.S. 
No. 1, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, O.A.S.T.S No. 1-A, 
OEA/Ser. A/2(SEPF)Add., by the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, Dec. 5, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. 
No. 66, OEA/Ser.A/41 (SEPF), by the Protocol of Washington, Dec. 14, 1992, 1-E Rev. 
OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add. 3 (SEPF), and by the Protocol of Managua, 
June 10, 1993, 1-F Rev. OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add.4 (SEPF), the 
integrated text reflecting all four amendments available at 
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang= E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ ch 
arter.html (last visited February 6, 2006) [hereinafter OAS Charter]. See id. pmbl. para. 3. 
2. Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept. 11, 
2001, OAS Doc. OEA/SerP/AG/Res.l (2001), 28th Spec. Sess., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/ 
AG?Res.l (XXVIII-E/01) (OAS General Assembly) (Sept. 11, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1289 
(2001) [hereinafter Democratic Charter], available at http://www.oas.org (follow 
"Welcome" hyperlink; then follow "Documents & Reports" hyperlink and choose 
"Democratic Charter") (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). See Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, 
In Defense of Democracy, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 283 (2004). 
3. Democratic Charter, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 1. 
4. OAS Charter, supra note 1, art. 3(e). 
5. Stephen J. Schnably, Constitutiona/ism and Democratic Government in the Inter-
American System, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 155, 168-71 
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) [hereinafter Schnably, Constitutionalism]; 
Support for the Democratic Government of the Constitutional President of the Republic of 
Ecuador, OAS Perm. Council Res. OEA/Ser.G CPIRES. 764 (1221/00) (Jan. 26, 2000), 
available at http://www.oas.org (last visited Dec. 30, 2005); Support for the Democratic 
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more ambiguous situations. The OAS condemned the autogolpes in 
Peru in 1992 and Guatemala in 1993, in which civilian presidents 
suspended the constitution and other branches of government, but it 
reacted passively to Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori's subsequent 
success in building on the autogolpe to bring into force a new 
constitution that greatly increased his powers.6 It condemned the 
attempted removal of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in 2002, in 
which he was asserted to have resigned,7 but it remained silent in 2004, 
when former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide asserted that he 
had not resigned but had been forced out by armed militias and U.S. 
duplicity. 
Judging when intense political struggle between branches of 
government crosses the line into a coup or unconstitutional rupture can 
be exceedingly difficult, as can be determining when the military has 
coerced apparently voluntary resignations. One way to deal with 
ambiguous threats, which are likely to recur, might be to define 
democracy more concretely. The Inter-American Democratic Charter 
defines democracy to encompass not only free elections and human 
rights but also "the rule of law" together with "the separation of powers 
and independence of the branches of government. "8 Addressing the 
OAS in January 2005, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter listed eight 
factors he said could help determine when representative democracy has 
been disrupted, such as "[ v ]iolation of the integrity of central 
institutions, including constitutional checks and balances providing for 
the separation of powers."9 The Declaration of Florida, adopted by the 
OAS General Assembly in June 2005, presents "full respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, [and] the separation of 
Government of the Constitutional President of the Republic of Ecuador, Jamil Mahuad Witt, 
and for the Institutions Under the Rule of Law, OAS Perm. Council Res. OEA/Ser.G 
CP/RES. 763 (1220/00) (Jan. 21, 2000), available at http://www.oas.org (last visited Dec. 
30, 2005). 
6. See Schnably, Constitutionalism, supra note 5, at 171-75. 
7. Situation in Venezuela, OAS Perm. Council Res. OEA/Ser.G, CP/RES. 811 
( 1315/02) (Apr. 13, 2002), available at http://www.oas.org (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
8. Democratic Charter, supra note 2, art. 1(3). 
9. Jimmy Carter, Former President of the United States, The Promise and Peril of 
Democracy, Speech at the OAS Inaugural Lecture Series of the Americas (Jan. 25, 2005), 
available at http://www.cartercenter.org/doc1995.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) 
(discussing eight conditions of democracy). See Maxwell A. Cameron, Strengthening 
Checks and Balances: Democracy Defense and Promotion in the Americas, 10 CANADIAN 
FOREIGN POL'Y 101, 101-16 (2003) (discussing five challenges to democracy in Latin 
America). See, e.g., Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance, Atdakar, A/SPl/12/01, art. 1 (Dec. 21, 2001) 
[hereinafter ECOW AS Good Governance]. 
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powers and independence of the judiciary" as inextricably bound up 
with "democratic institutions."10 
Any sustained effort to create a regional or transnational 
constitutional law would, however, deeply implicate the OAS and 
member states in constitutional design and interpretation. What does 
"separation of powers" mean in parliamentary systems? Does judicial 
independence require judicial review? Do term limits make presidents 
too independent? Does constitutional amendment by popular plebiscite 
give voice to the will of the people or undermine the rule of law by 
subjecting basic structures to the passions of the moment? 
Answering these questions concretely on a regional basis would 
involve a far greater tum away from non-intervention than the OAS has 
undertaken to date. Most recently, the OAS General Assembly declined 
to adopt a proposal, reportedly offered by the U.S., to create a 
permanent body to monitor democracy in member states. The 
monitoring body would have been empowered to hear from labor 
unions and civic groups who thought the government was not governing 
democratically .11 The OAS General Assembly did, however, instruct 
the Secretary General to develop proposals for mechanisms to 
"address[] situations that might affect the workings of the political 
process of democratic institutions or the legitimate exercise of power."12 
The reluctance to accept the initial U.S. proposal cannot be 
10. Declaration of Florida, Delivering the Benefits of Democracy pmbl. para. 18, 
AG/DEC. 41 (XXXV-0/05) (June 7, 2005) [hereinafter Declaration of Florida]. 
11. See Joel Brinkley, US. Proposal in the O.A.S. Draws Fire as an Attack on 
Venezuela, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, § 1, at 10; Joel Brinkley, Latin States Shun U.S. Plan 
To Watch Over Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at A8. The initial U.S. proposal was 
not made public. A subsequent U.S. proposal without the monitoring body asserted that 
"governments that do not [govern democratically] should be held accountable," and would 
have directed the Secretary General to "propos[ e] specific measures to strengthen the 
effectiveness and application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter." It also would have 
directed the Permanent Council to "develop a process to assess, as appropriate, situations 
that may affect the development of a Member State's democratic political institutional 
process or the legitimate exercise of power; and to make concrete recommendations, using 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter as its guide and with input from civil society, on 
how the Permanent Council should address threats to democracy in a timely fashion, 
anticipating crises that might undermine democracy." Draft Declaration of Florida-
Delivering the Benefits of Democracy, paras. 7, 17, and 18, reprinted in MIAMI HERALD, 
June 5, 2005, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/11822010.htm (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
12. The final version of the Declaration of Florida adopted by the General Assembly 
eliminated the language in the earlier draft about holding governments accountable, made 
the instructions to the Secretary General and Permanent Council more general, and added a 
reference to nonintervention. Declaration of Florida, supra note I 0, pmbl. para., 18, and 
paras. 3, 5. 
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dismissed as a simple desire by member states to escape scrutiny. 
Paradoxically, if the OAS were to try to define democracy in detail, the 
very effort would violate the right to democracy. Democracy requires a 
high degree of internal domestic choice in the form of government. The 
commitment to non-intervention is in part an expression of the right to 
democracy. 
Perhaps, then, states should be free to adopt any plausibly 
democratic constitutional structure, but having done so should be 
required to respect that structure, including rules governing change. 
The OAS' s emphasis on responding to interruptions of constitutional 
government might be explained as an attempt to ensure constitutional 
fidelity. In 1991, it promised to respond immediately to "any 
occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the 
democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of 
power by the democratically elected government" of an OAS member. 13 
The Protocol of Washington, which amended the OAS Charter, 
provides for suspension of a state "whose democratically constituted 
government has been overthrown by force." 14 The Inter-American 
Democratic Charter commits the OAS to respond to "an 
unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously 
impairs the democratic order in a member state."15 The Declaration of 
Florida envisions the possibility of an OAS mechanism to "address[] 
situations that might affect the workings of the political process of 
democratic institutions or the legitimate exercise of power."16 
Other organizations have similar commitments. MERCOSUR, a 
free trade association among several South American nations, agreed in 
1996 to respond to any "interruption in the democratic order" of its 
members or associates. 17 The Organization of African Unity formally 
bound itself in 2000 to protect democracy against "unconstitutional 
changes of government."18 The Economic Community of West African 
13. Representative Democracy, para. I, OEA/Ser.P, OAS Doc. AG/RES. 1080 (:XXl-
0/9I) (June 5, I99I). 
I4. Texts Approved by the General Assembly at its Sixteenth Special Session in 
Connection with the Amendments to the Charter of the Organization, OEA/Ser.P, OAS Doc. 
AG/doc.I I (XVl-E/92) (I992) (Article 8 bis) (Article 9 of the amended Charter). 
I5. Democratic Charter, supra note 2, art. I9. See id. art. 20. 
I6. Declaration of Florida, supra note 10, para. 3. 
I 7. Protocolo de Ushuaia Sohre Compromiso Democnitico en el Mercosur, la 
Republica de Bolivia y la Republica de Chile, art. 4 (I 996), 
http://www.mercosur.org. uy/espanol/snor/varios/protocolo_ushuaia.htm (last visited Dec. 
30, 2005). 
I 8. Declaration on the Framework for an Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, 36th Sess. of the Assembly of Heads 
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States (ECOW AS) agreed in 2001 to respond to situations where 
"democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means" in member 
states. 19 
Emphasis on constitutional fidelity does less to resolve the paradox 
than one might hope, for the practice of responding to coups or other 
interruptions in democratic government requires surprisingly intrusive 
and contestable interpretations of other countries' constitutions. A 
recent example from the West African Republic of Togo vividly 
illustrates this problem-and suggests that it may be common to any 
regional effort to protect constitutional democracy. 
Gnassingbe Eyadema, Togo's President since 1967, died on 
February 5, 2005.20 Within hours the military declared his son Faure 
Gnassingbe the new President. Article 65 of Togo's Constitution, 
however, provided that if the President died the Speaker of the 
legislature-the President of the National Assembly-was to exercise 
the functions of the presidency for sixty days, at which time an election 
would be held. 21 In Paris when the President died, the Speaker 
subsequently asserted from Benin that he was the true constitutional 
successor. 22 
ECOWAS called Faure Gnassingbe's accession a "violation of the 
[Togolese] Constitution."23 The African Union (AU) deemed it "a 
blatant and unacceptable violation of the Togolese Constitution."24 The 
of State and Government, Lome, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) (July 10-12, 2000), 
available at http://www.africa-union.org (follow the "Welcome" hyperlink; then follow the 
"Special Programs" hyperlink to the "The Conference on Security, Stability Development 
and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA)" hyperlink and choose the title of the cited 
declaration) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
19. See ECOWAS Good Governance, supra note 9, art. 45; see also Declaration of 
Political Principles of the Economic Community of West African States, 14th Sess. of the 
Authority of Heads of States and Government, Abuja, ECOWAS Doc. A/DCL. 117/91 (July 
4-6, 1991). 
20. Gnassingbe Eyadema, 69, Togo Ruler, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2005, at B8. See 
Lydia Polgreen, Ruling Dynasty Seems to Start, Leaving Many in Togo Resentful, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2005, at All. 
21. TOGO CONST. art. 65, reprinted in XVIII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz & Patricie H. Ward eds., 2004) [hereinafter Togo Const.]. 
22. Fambare Natchaba Veut Toujours Assurer /'interim au Togo [Fambare Natchaba 
claims leadership in Togo], article in L' ACTUALITE DU TOGO, Feb. 28, 2005, 
http://www.izf.net/izf/index.htm (follow "Actualite" hyperlink; then follow "Togo" 
hyperlink and search for the date of article cited) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
23 . Press Release, ECOW AS Salutes the Memory of President Eyadema, Condemns 
the Violation of the Constitution and Calls for a Return to Constitutional Order (Feb. 5, 
2005); Communique, ECOWAS, On the Situation in Togo, Cotonou (Feb. 11, 2005). 
24. Communique of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the African Union, Peace and 
Security Council (Part B), On the Situation in Togo, AU PSC/PR/Comm. (XXIV), Addis 
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U.N. Secretary General said the transfer of power had "not been done in 
full respect of the provisions of the Constitution."25 The U.S. State 
Department called it "an unconstitutional move."26 France, Togo's 
former colonial ruler, took the same position.27 
Was the accession of Gnassingbe Eyadema's son constitutional? 
At first the government rested its defense of his accession on a 
sweeping claim of inherent power in a national emergency. The military 
asserted that the speaker's absence from the country at the moment the 
president died created a power vacuum that called for swift action to 
ensure stability and security. The military undercut its argument, 
however, by announcing the suspension of the constitution and closing 
the country's borders, preventing the Speaker's return.28 
The government soon presented a constitutional case less easily 
dismissed. On February 6, the Togolese legislature elected Faure 
Eyadema its new speaker. By unanimous vote it also exercised its 
power under Article 144 to amend the constitution with the concurrence 
of at least four-fifths of the members, changing Article 65 to allow the 
son to serve out the remainder of his father's term.29 Faure Gnassingbe 
Ababa, Ethiopia (Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Communique, On the Situation in Togo]. 
25. Press Release, U.N., Secretary-General Concerned Togo's Power Transfer Not 
Done 'In Full Respect' of Constitution, U.N. Doc. SB/SM971 l, AFR/1106 (Feb. 7, 2005). 
26. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, Background Note: Togo, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5430.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. 
DEP'T OF STATE]. 
27. France Insists on Respect for Togo's Constitution, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY 
(PANA) DAILY NEWSWIRE, Feb. 7, 2005. See also Francophonie Threatens Togo with 
Suspension, PANA DAILY NEWSWIRE, Feb. 8, 2005 (criticism from Francophonie 
Parliamentary Assembly regarding the violation of the Togolese constitution). 
28. Togo: Military Suspend Constitution, Eyadema 's Son Takes Power, INTEGRATED 
REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORKS (IRIN NEWS), Feb. 5, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org 
(follow "West Africa" hyperlink; then follow "Togo" hyperlink and search for date of 
article) (last visted Dec. 30, 2005). See also Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Post-Eyadema 
Togo-A Military Coup or Unconstitutional Government? DIASTODE (Feb. 2005), 
http://www.diastode.org/Nouvelles/usnews235.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2005); Togo Sees 
Sense, ACCRA MAIL, reprinted in AFR. NEWS, Feb. 22, 2005 [hereinafter Togo Sees Sense], 
http://lexis-nexis.com (follow "News & Business," "By Country & Region," "Middle East 
& Africa" hyperlinks, then choose "Africa News" database and search title and date of 
article) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
29. Loi No. 2005-002 de 6 Fevrier 2005 portant modification des articles 65 et 144 de 
la Constitution [Law No. 2005-002 of Feb. 6, 2005 amending articles 65 and 144 of the 
Constitution], reprinted in J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE TOGOALISE, NUMERO SPECIAL, 
Feb. 6, 2005 [hereinafter Loi No. 2005-002] (amending art. 65 to provide, "Le nouveau 
President de la Republique exerce ses fontions jusqu'au terme du mandate de son 
predecesseur" ["The new President of the Republic will perform his duties until the end of 
his predecessor's term."]. See also Togo: La Regime de Faure Gnassingbe Sanctionne 
[Togo: Faure Gnassingbe's Regime Sanctioned], BBC AFRIQUE.COM, Feb. 20, 2005 
[hereinafter BBC AFRIQUE.COM, Togo], 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2005], Art. 19
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/19
2005] The OAS and Constitutionalism 269 
was sworn in the next day. These after-the-fact changes were not 
entirely unlike Peru's retroactive regularization of the autogolpe 
through the promulgation of a new constitution by a relatively 
powerless constituent assembly in 1992 and 1993. 
ECOW AS condemned the "illegal amendment" of the 
constitution,"30 calling it nothing more than pure and simple 
"manipulations of the Constitution by the National Assembly"-a 
"cover-up" for a "coup d'etat."31 It proceeded to impose sanctions.32 
The AU "firmly condemn[ed] the revision of the Togolese Constitution 
made by the de facto authorities, in violation of the relevant provisions 
of the Togolese Constitution,"33 and suspended Togo's participation in 
the AU.34 
To assert that constitutional amendments are unconstitutional is to 
venture into interpretive territory more often explored by scholars than 
by regional political bodies. To be sure, there was ample ground in 
Article 144 to question the amendments' validity. Article 144 provides 
that amendments may not be adopted when the presidency is vacant. 35 
(It also prohibits amendments that would revise the "Republican form 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/french/highlights/story/2005/02/050220_togosanctions.shtml (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2005); Vacance du Pouvoir: Les Deputes Votent la Revision de la 
Constitution [Vacant Powers: Members of Parliament vote on the revision of the 
Constitution], article in L'ACTUALITE DU Tooo (Feb. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Vacance du 
Pouvoir], http://www.izf.net/izf/index.htm (follow "Actualite" hyperlink; then follow 
"Togo" hyperlink and search for the date of article cited) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
30. Press Release, ECOWAS Holds Extraordinary Meeting on the Situation in Togo 
(Feb. 8, 2005). "In violation of the Togolese Constitution, following its illegal amendment, 
Faure Gnassingbe, son of the late president, was designated to succeed his father." Id. 
31. Final Communique, ECOW AS, Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and 
Government, Niamey (Feb. 9, 2005), para. 5. 
32. Id. para. 6; see also Communique Issued by the Current Chairman ECOW AS 
(Mamadou Tandja, President of the Republic of Niger and Chairman of the Authority of 
Heads of State and Government ofECOWAS) (Feb. 18, 2005). 
33. Communique, On the Situation in Togo, supra note 24. 
34. Communique of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union Peace and Security/Permanent Representatives/Committee (AU 
PSC/PR/Comm.) XXV (Feb. 25 2005); see Press Release No. 02/2005, Addis Ababa, (Feb. 
19, 2005), available at www.africa-union.org/News_Events/ 
Press_Releases/19%202005%20Togo%20-%20%20eng.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) 
(statement by Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairperson, Commission of the African Union, that 
Faure Gnassingbe's continuation as President, even pending elections would violate the 
Togolese Constitution); see also Communique of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Peace and 
Security Council of the AU PSC/PR/Comm. XXX, Addis Ababa, Ethopia (May 27, 2005) 
(the AU sanctions were eventually lifted after the presidential election conducted under 
ECOW AS auspices in April 2005). 
35. Togo Const., supra note 21, art. 144. 
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of the State. ")36 The presidency may well have been vacant on 
February 6, when the legislature adopted the amendments. The 
military's initial recognition of Gnassingbe Eyadema's son as President 
was questionable, to say the least, and his election as Speaker would not 
clearly have made him President as opposed to simply entitling him to 
exercise presidential powers pending elections. 
As U.S. constitutional scholars have pondered whether Article V's 
own amendment procedures could be employed to eliminate its 
prohibition against depriving a U.S. state of equal suffrage in the Senate 
without its consent,37 so too did the Togolese legislature recognize that a 
constitutional limitation on the amendment power might itself be 
amended out of existence. Thus at the same time it elected Gnassingbe 
Eyadema's son as Speaker and amended Article 65, the Togolese 
legislature also amended Article 144 to remove the prohibition of 
constitutional amendments when the presidency was vacant. 38 
ECOW AS and the AU were unmoved, and their steadfastness 
pressured Togo to back down. On February 21, the National Assembly 
amended the constitution yet again to provide for elections within sixty 
days, essentially reversing the previous amendments.39 Four days later 
Faure Gnassingbe resigned, paving the way for a new Speaker and 
Interim President, Abass Bonfoh.40 
There is much to be said for a judgment that something other than 
the spirit of democracy infused Togo's hasty constitutional revisions. 
What is striking, however, is that the condemnations were expressed so 
strongly in constitutional terms, given the potential complexity of the 
legal argument. Similar complexities arose in the conduct of the 
36. Id. 
37. U.S. Const. art. V. See, e.g., Scott J. Bowman, Note, Wild Political Dreaming: 
Constitutional Reformation of the United States Senate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017 (2004). 
38. Loi No. 2005-002, supra note 29 (removing reference to vacancy of the 
presidency); see BBC AFRIQUE.COM, Togo, supra note 29; see also Vacance du Pouvoir, 
supra note 29. 
39. Loi No. 2005-006 de 24 Fevrier 2005 modifiant les articles 65 et 144 de la 
Constitution [Law No. 2005-006 of Feb. 24, 2005 amending articles 65 and 144 of the 
Constitution], reprinted in J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE TOGOLAISE, NUMERO SPECIAL, 
Feb. 24, 2005 (restoring the Togolese Constitution, arts. 65 and 144, to its former text). 
40. Lydia Polgreen, Togo Ruler, Succumbing to Pressure, Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2005, at A6; see Togo Sees Sense, supra note 28; Press Release, ECOW AS, Faure 
Gnassingbe Steps Down, ECOWAS Lifts Sanctions (Feb. 26, 2005), 
http://www.sec.ecowas; Emmanuel Goujon, Nouvelle Reforme Constitutionnelle Que Ne 
Change Rien au Fond [New Constitutional Reform Which Ultimately Changes Nothing], 
article in L'ACTUALITE DU TOGO, Feb. 21, 2005, http://www.izf.net/izf/index.htm (follow 
"Actualite" hyperlink; then follow "Togo" hyperlink and search for the date of article cited) 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
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presidential election that followed, and in each case ECOW AS and 
other international actors showed little hesitancy in interpreting the 
Constitution. 
One issue related to the timing of the election. On February 28, 
2005, shortly after Faure Gnassingbe had resigned, ECOW AS met with 
the government and opposition parties and announced that "transparent, 
free and fair elections" for President would need to be held "within 60 
days as required by the Constitution of Togo.''41 Sixty days after 
Gnassingbe Eyadema died would have been April 6, 2005, but 
ECOW AS declared two days later that "the 60 days Interim period 
prescribed by the Constitution of Togo in article 65 shall be deemed to 
have started on the 26th February, 2005 with the coming into office of 
Mr. A bass Bonfoh as Interim President. ''42 In dating the vacancy in 
relation to the resignation of Faure Gnassingbe, rather than in relation to 
the death of his father, Gnassingbe Eyadema, ECOW AS might appear 
to have contradicted its view that Faure Gnassingbe had never 
legitimately occupied the office in the first place. On the other hand, 
opposition parties claimed that holding an election quickly after years of 
dictatorship would give them insufficient time to organize,43 and the 
slightly later date did provide somewhat more time to prepare for the 
election. 
A second issue related to eligibility. Long-time opposition leader 
Gilchrist Olympio, son of Togo's first president (who had been 
assassinated in 1963 ), had been in exile in France since 1992, when 
government forces nearly assassinated him. 44 In 2002, Parliament-
dominated then as in February 2005 by the ruling party-amended the 
Constitution to prohibit the candidacy of anyone who "does not reside 
in the national territory for at least twelve (12) months.''45 Olympio was 
thereby eliminated as a candidate in the 2003 presidential election. 
Nearly two years later, Faure Gnassingbe-whom ECOW AS had just 
thwarted from what it deemed an attempted coup d'etat-qualified as a 
41. Togo: Government and Opposition Agree on Major Contentious Electoral Issues, 
WORLD NEWS NETWORK, LOME, (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.lome.com. 
42. Press Release, ECOW AS Calls for Commencement of Progress Towards Holding 
Presidential Elections (Mar. 2, 2005); see also Togolese Political [Leaders] Sign Agreement 
on Upcoming Presidential Polls, BBC, Mar. 30, 2005 (text of agreement signed 
government, opposition parties, and ECOW AS concerning April 24 election). 
43. See Togo: Clashes Break Out as People Complain of Being Denied Voters' Cards 
for Presidential Poll, IRIN NEWS, Apr. 1, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org (follow "West 
Africa" hyperlink; then follow "Togo" hyperlink and search for date of article) (last visted 
Dec. 30, 2005). 
44. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 26. 
45. Id. 
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candidate in the April 2005 election, while Olympio was again barred 
from running. (With Olympio' s endorsement the opposition nominated 
instead Emmanuel Bob-Akitani, widely viewed as a stand-in for 
Olympio. )46 
On April 26, 2005, Togo's electoral commission reported Faure 
Gnassingbe the winner with sixty percent of the vote, with Bob-Akitani 
receiving thirty-eight percent. Claiming that the election was tainted by 
ballot fraud, restrictions on the press, and insufficient time to organize, 
opposition figures publicly rejected the outcome.47 ECOW AS, which 
had sent 150 observers shortly before the election, pronounced the 
election in accord with international standards.48 The U.S. expressed 
serious concerns about the fairness of the election.49 There were signs 
46. See, e.g., Togo: Opposition Calls for Postponement of Presidential Election, IRIN 
NEWS, Mar. 28, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org (follow "West Africa" hyperlink; then 
follow "Togo" hyperlink and search for date of article) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
47. On April 27, Emmanuel Bob-Akitani declared himself the president of Togo and 
called on supporters to "fight with our lives if necessary." Togo: Poll Chaos Spreads, 
Hundreds Flee, Opposition Leader Declares Himself President, IRIN NEWS, Apr. 27, 2005, 
http://www.irinnews.org (follow "West Africa" hyperlink; then follow "Togo" hyperlink 
and search for date of article) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). ECOW AS' s Executive Secretary 
quickly rejected the declaration, deeming it "very similar to action of the military in 
declaring a successor for President Eyadema," and called on all parties to "work within the 
Constitution and the law of the country." Togo: Togo's Opposition Candidate Declares Self 
President, THIS DAY, reprinted in AFR. NEWS, Apr. 28, 2005, http://lexis-nexis.com (follow 
"News & Business," "By Country & Region," "Middle East & Africa" hyperlinks, then 
choose "Africa News" database and search title and date of article) (last visited Dec. 30, 
2005). The U.S. condemned what it deemed "calls for violent protests." U.S. Condemns 
Violence in Togo, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 28, 2005 (remarks of U.S. State 
Dep't spokesperson, Adam Ereli), http://lexis-nexis.com (follow "News & Business," "By 
Country & Region," "Middle East & Africa" hyperlinks, then choose "Xinhua General 
News Service" database and search title and date of article) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) 
[hereinafter U.S. Condemns Violence in Togo]; see also Togo; IFJ Condemns 'Media 
Blockade' in Togo Ahead of Presidential Elections, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF 
JOURNALISTS, reprinted in AFR. NEWS, Apr. 22, 2005, http://lexis-nexis.com (follow "News 
& Business," "By Country & Region," "Middle East & Africa" hyperlinks, then choose 
"Africa News" database and search title and date of article) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
48. See U.S. Condemns Violence in Togo, supra note 47. For one analysis of 
ECOWAS's stance, see Election 2005: Twenty-Two Dead So Far as Togo Post-Poll 
Violence Escalates, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Apr. 28, 2005. 
49. See U.S. Challenges Election Results in Togo, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY (PANA) 
DAILY NEWSWIRE, Apr. 28, 2005; Togo: Diplomatic Documents Surface Citing Fraud in 
April Poll, IRIN NEWS, May 6, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org (follow "West Africa" 
hyperlink; then follow "Togo" hyperlink and search for date of article) (last visited Dec. 30, 
2005) (citing European Union briefing papers which reported nearly a million phantom 
voters); Togo's Human Rights Leader Queries ECOWAS Monitors Over Togo, PANA 
DAILY NEWSWIRE, May 6, 2005, http://papapress.com (follow "Togo," then search for date 
of article) (reporting criticism from the Togolese League of Human Rights (LTDH) over 
what it termed ECOWAS's failure to acknowledge massive vote fraud). 
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of a systematic and brutal crackdown on dissent by the Togolese 
military; reports indicated that hundreds of people were killed and tens 
of thousands fled Togo.5° Faure Gnassingbe was sworn in as the new 
president on May 4, 2005.51 
The positions ECOWAS took on Togo's Constitution in 
overseeing the election raise interesting questions. If the amendments 
that would have validated Faure Gnassingbe's assumption of the 
presidency in February 2005 amounted to no more than invalid 
manipulations of the constitution, should the same be said for the ruling 
party's adoption of the residency requirement in 2002, apparently to 
exclude an exiled opposition leader from running for office? What 
legitimate leeway might there be in interpreting and applying a 
constitutional mandate for a quick election to fill a vacancy in a country 
that had not held a free or fair elections for decades? 
More generally, how should such questions be approached? In 
dealing with the exclusion of former Guatemalan Dictator Rios Montt 
from running for President, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights once suggested that there was a "customary constitutional rule 
with a strong tradition in Central America" excluding coup d'etat 
participants from running for President. 52 Would ECOW AS have been 
justified in finding or asserting a similar rule of transnational 
constitutional law in West Africa, perhaps using it as a basis for 
interpreting Article 58 of the Togolese Constitution (stating that the 
President is to be "the guarantor of ... the institutions of the Republic") 
to exclude a former coup participant from running? Using regional 
50. See Togo: Human Rights Group Says 790 Killed in Election Violence, IRIN NEWS, 
May 13, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org (follow "West Africa" hyperlink; then follow 
"Togo" hyperlink and search for date of article) (last visted Dec. 30, 2005) (noting the 
estimate of 100 dead by the government and 790 dead by L TDH estimates). The office of 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that over 35,000 refugees 
fled Togo in the aftermath of the election. See Press Briefing, UNHCR, Togo: Over 3,000 
Fled to Benin and Ghana in June, (July 1, 2005) (noting total of 38,492 refugees), 
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm?tbl=NEWS&page=home&id=42c515fc 11 (last visited Dec. 
30, 2005); see also Press Release, U.N. Human Rights High Commissioner to Send Mission 
to Togo to Assess Allegations of Violations Linked to Elections, U.N. Doc. HR/4855 (June 
10, 2005), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/hr8455.doc.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 
2005). 
51. Faure Gnassingbe Sworn in as Togo's New President, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS 
SERVICE, May 4, 2005, http://lexis-nexis.com (follow "News & Business," "By Country & 
Region," "Middle East & Africa" hyperlinks, then choose "Xinhua General News Service" 
database and search title and date of article) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
52. Rios Montt v. Guatemala, Case No. 10,804, Int.-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 30/93, 
OEA/Ser.LN/II.79 rev. 1, doc. 12, 22, ~~ 29, 38 (1993); see Schnably, Constitutionalism, 
supra note 5, at 185-86. 
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customary law would have been an assertive though not entirely 
implausible approach to interpreting the Constitution. 
Alternatively, one could understand ECOWAS's approach in terms 
of constitutional fidelity. Perhaps it reflected a judgment that adherence 
to a constitutional text in a fairly literal manner, with little regard for its 
origins and context, is the best route over the long run to a creating a 
strong constitutional underpinning to democracy. The prospect of 
credible pressure by international bodies to adhere to the terms of the 
text might lend attractiveness to this vision of constitutional fidelity. 
Granted, the immediate outcome-installation of the late President's 
son after an election widely regarded as tainted by fraud and enforced 
by systematic violence-gives little sign of any advance towards 
democracy. But that outcome does not in itself settle the longer-run 
question of constitutionalism and democracy. 
Contrast the vigor of the constitutional interpretation displayed in 
the West African regional response to Togo's succession crisis, 
notwithstanding fundamental ambiguities in both interpretation and 
method, with the regional response in the Americas to one of Ecuador's 
frequent constitutional upheavals some years earlier. In 1997, the 
Ecuadorian Congress removed the widely unpopular President Abdala 
Bucaram. Instead of impeaching him under Article 82(g) of the 
Constitution, Congress removed him under Article 100 for "mental 
incapacity." With a show of institutional assertiveness echoing 
Fujimori' s actions in Peru in 1992, the Ecuadorian Congress also 
removed the Attorney General, the Comptroller, and members of the 
Constitutional Court. Bucaram may have earned (indeed courted) the 
nickname "El Loco," but there was little question that Congress simply 
made a strategic and contestable choice to use the simpler of the two 
routes to remove him. Refusing to accept the legality of his removal, 
Bucaram called Congress' action an "attempted coup." Neither the OAS 
nor any member states took an official position on the constitutionality 
of Bucaram's removal or the competing claims of succession put forth 
by the Vice-President and the Head of Congress. One U.S. official was 
quoted as saying that "the law is ambiguous. . . . It's not for us to tell 
the Ecuadorian people how they should interpret their Constitution. "53 
The Ecuadorian military resolved the struggle by withdrawing 
recognition of Bucaram and pressing civilian leaders to settle on a 
successor. 
The lnter-:American Democratic Charter was adopted four years 
53. Andres Oppenheimer, Democracies Stay Out of Ecuador Controversy, MIAMI 
HERALD, Feb. 8, 1997, at 20A; see Schnably, Constitutionalism, supra note 5, at 178-80. 
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later in 2001. In April 2005, Ecuador's Congress removed yet another 
president (one of four from 1997 to date), finding pursuant to Article 
167(6) of the Ecuadorian Constitution that he had abandoned his post-
a conclusion he disputed until the military announced it would no longer 
recognize him. 54 Even as the OAS General Assembly met in June 2005 
amidst calls for more vigorous enforcement of the Charter's 
endorsement of the separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, 
and the rule of law, Bolivia experienced a crisis of succession. Its 
President and both the first and second in line to succeed him resigned 
in the face of widespread protests. 55 
Claims by the U.S. government and some non-governmental 
organizations that crises like these should meet with a more active OAS 
response in light of the adoption of the Charter appear to assume that 
the modesty displayed in the regional response to Ecuador's 
constitutional crisis in 1997 should now be discarded. 56 As the more 
assertive approach to constitutional interpretation displayed in the 
regional response to Togo's crisis makes clear, however, the blend of 
complexity and impact so distinctive to constitutional controversies cuts 
both ways. Governments' interpretations of their own constitutions are 
typically marked by a heavy dose of domestic self-interest; the events in 
Togo in February 2005 may show that some regional constraint on the 
process could be desirable. But those events, and the questions 
ECOW AS faced in overseeing the elections, also show how deeply 
international or regional organizations can be drawn into reasonably 
contestable issues of constitutional interpretation. And however marked 
by self-interest a government's interpretation of its own constitution 
may be, it would be unwise to assume that states' interpretations of 
other countries' constitutions will be free of their own foreign policy 
self-interest. The U.S. government's initial position (quickly 
withdrawn) that Chavez's apparent departure in the events of April 
54. See 'Constitutional Coup' by Congress Ousts Gutierrez on Wave of Popular 
Protests, LATIN AMERICAN WEEKLY REPORT, Apr. 26, 2005 . 
55. See Juan Forero, Bolivia Installs New Leader With Very Long 'To Do' List, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2005, at A7. 
56. This is not to say that prior to the Charter, member states never took the occasion to 
pronounce on the proper interpretation of other countries' constitutions. The U.S., for 
example, took a very firm stance on a contestable point of interpretation of Haiti's 
Constitution when it returned Aristide to power in 1994, requiring him to accept that his first 
term would end in 1996, five years after he had been sworn in, even though a military coup 
had prevented him from serving most of his term. Schnably, Constitutionalism, supra note 
5, at 190-91. However, it seems plausible that the Charter's references to constitutional 
concepts like the separation of powers, together with recent calls for the OAS to hold 
governments accountable for governing democratically, will produce more such occasions. 
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2002 represented the constitutionally valid resignation of an autocrat 
who needed to learn to "respect constitutional processes" was surely not 
unrelated to its hostility to his political positions and rhetoric. 57 It is 
equally hard to imagine that the U.S. initiative in the June 2005 OAS 
meeting was entirely unrelated to its consistent hostility to Chavez, even 
though the proposal cannot be dismissed simply as another diplomatic 
maneuver against a government not in favor with the U.S. If states and 
regional bodies become more deeply involved in interpreting other 
countries' constitutions, there is a danger that they will have a new and 
substantially more intrusive means of pursuing their own foreign policy 
aims. 
In short, whether it takes the form of transnational constitutional 
law or an emphasis on constitutional fidelity, a practice of regional 
interpretation of constitutions presents dangers as well as benefits. A 
keen appreciation of both is an essential guide to any further 
development of the OAS' s new involvement in constitutionalism. 
57. See Meet the Press: Condoleezza Rice Discusses the Situation in the Middle East 
and the Venezuelan Presidential Crisis (NBC television broadcast Apr. 14, 2002), 
(transcript available at LexisNexis); Press Statement, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Venezuela: 
Change of Government (Apr. 12, 2002), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9316.html 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
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